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In response to the increasingly
authoritarian government of Hosni Muburak,
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as
the only meaningful opposition party—even
though the Brotherhood has been illegal for the
last fifty years. Despite its often violent and
murky past, in the last twenty years the
Brotherhood has preached a platform based on
moderate and peaceful Islamic activism as well
as the compatibility of democracy and Islam.
However, there are still elements of the Muslim
Brotherhood that suggest certain democratic
values would be abandoned should the
Brotherhood achieve power, and some critics
who contend that the recent changes in the
Brotherhood are a ploy to achieve political
power.
A comparison to the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), an Indian Hindu-nationalist party,
as well as a vein of democratic theory known as
moderation theory, are both useful tools to
address these concerns. The comparison of the
BJP to the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates
that, in the case of both parties, popular support
was linked to the party’s status as the only
viable opposition to the existing political
regime, not support for a religious platform.
The popularity of oppositional rhetoric allows
for cleavages within the party to be temporarily
masked. Pre-existing political elites who
controlled the party voiced a religious platform
that is not representative of the party’s new
popular support but did not cost the party that
popular support. Achieving political power

forces the entrenched party elite to confront the
true nature of its support or risk losing it.
Moderation theory posits that rational decisions
by political elites within the party lead the party
to adopt a more moderate platform in pursuit of
electoral success, which has already happened
several times during the recent history of the
Muslim Brotherhood. Both analytic tools
suggest that, if legalized and Egypt’s political
system democratized, the Brotherhood would
positively contribute to democratic governance
in Egypt.
While the Muslim Brotherhood’s recent
return to prominence was a product of party
decisions of the last twenty years, an
understanding of the origins of the Muslim
Brotherhood is necessary to understand the
controversial space the group occupies in the
Egyptian political and social sphere. Much of
the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood is
unclear but it is known that the organization was
founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The
group often participated in anti-Christian
activism as a method of opposing the British
occupation of Egypt (Mitchell p. 2). Soon after
its formation, the Brotherhood established itself
as one of the only effective anti-colonial groups,
earning it a great deal of grassroots public
support very early in its history (Mitchell p. 9).
One stated goal of the organization at its
inception, which continues to this day, is the
installation of the Sharia as a national body of
law. This made the Brotherhood one of the first
60

Published by KnightScholar, 2011

1

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2010 [2011], Art. 10

role it previously held under Nasser, as the state
is often unable to compete with the services
provided by the Brotherhood (Harrigan 105).
The second major organizational
development was the creation of the Secret
Apparatus, which occurred sometime between
1930 and 1947 (Mitchell p. 30). The Secret
Apparatus was a paramilitary branch of the
Brotherhood that used violence as a means to
achieve its goals. Several factors led to the
Secret Apparatus having a growing role in the
Muslim Brotherhood’s early history. World
War II provided Banna with an opportunity to
begin to collect the necessary arms for such a
group (Mitchell p. 26). The Muslim
Brotherhood legitimized their acquisition of
arms by claiming that the creation of an Israeli
state at the expense of the existing Palestinian
community required a group to defend
Palestinian interests. Internal schisms within
the Brotherhood also limited the effectiveness of
the formal leadership, which led to increased
emphasis on the more streamlined Secret
Apparatus (Mitchell p. 55). However, the formal
leadership of the Brotherhood did have firm
control over the actions of the Secret Apparatus.
The assassination of a judge, which Banna did
not approve of, led him realize this (Mitchell p.
78). The relationship of the formal leadership
and the Secret Apparatus is not clear, since the
Secret Apparatus was, by nature, secretive. It
existence was well-hidden from Egyptian and
British authorities for a period of time and was
only discovered by chance when the leader of
the Secret Apparatus was arrested by authorities
in 1948 with a briefcase containing details about
the members and its operations. Much of the
uncertainly surrounding the Brotherhood is a
product of the lack of concrete knowledge of the
role of the Secret Apparatus in the organization
and how vital it was believed to be by the
formal leadership.

overtly political Islamic groups established and
has existed as such continuously since its
founding, despite many crackdowns by various
governments. The relative antiquity and
persistence of the group has given it a
perception of historical legitimacy in the eyes of
many Egyptians. Furthermore, the role the
Brotherhood in the establishment of an
independent Egyptian state earned the group the
temporary support of the newly established
government under Gamal Nasser.
Shortly after the Brotherhood’s
founding, there were two organizational
developments that have continued to shape how
many have viewed the Muslim Brotherhood.
The first was the involvement of the Muslim
Brotherhood in social services; by creating a
social welfare branch, the organization was able
to receive government funding and avoid
classification as a religious organization
(Mitchell p. 37). This allowed the Brotherhood
to avoid the state crackdowns against
“religious” organizations when Arabian identity
began to be used as a source of legitimacy for
the secular Egyptian state under Nasser by the
early 1950s. The provision of social services
became especially important following Nasser
when Sadat, Nasser’s successor, began
attempting to court US aid in the 1970s. In an
effort to bring Egypt in line with norms of the
capitalist first world, Sadat reduced the heavy
government spending that Nasser had used to
provide social services to the Egyptian
population. The result was the emergence of a
faith-based welfare system in which the Muslim
Brotherhood which used mosques and religious
organizations to provide and distribute services
previously provided by the state (Harrigan p.
101). This has increased the Brotherhood’s
appeal to sectors of the population that might
not be drawn to the Brotherhood by its religious
activism (Harringan p. 104). Since this retreat,
the government has been unable to reclaim the
61
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p. 23-4). While in America, Qutb came to view
the west as a spiritual wasteland, mainly due to
its separation of church and state. This stay in
the United States radicalized him and became an
early influence on his religious philosophy.
After returning to Egypt following Banna’s
assassination in 1949, Qutb was soon
imprisoned for anti-government activism.
While in prison, Qutb released his manifesto,
Milestones. In this work, Qutb divided the
world into “us (people and government who
practiced an extremely strict adherence to
Islamic law) versus them (everyone else
including Muslims) (Haddad p. 79-86) and, in
this sense, some view Qutb’s work as the
ideological underpinning of many acts of
Islamic extremism, including the 9/11 terrorist
attacks (Wright).
Other scholars, such as Lawrence
Wright, believe Qutb had a more active role
within the organization. While Wright does not
make any judgment on the democratic viability
of the Muslim Brotherhood due to the limited
timeframe of the Brotherhood covered in his
book, his narrative of Qutb’s later years show
his belief that Qutb had a significant role within
the organization. During his time in prison,
Qutb reopened lines of communication among
the imprisoned Brothers (Zollner p. 26-7).
Despite being radical, Qutb’s philosophy was a
rebellion against Nasser’s secular regime and
offered a criticism more relevant to the situation
of an Islamic leader who ruled a repressive
secular state. While how seriously the
organization took this view is debatable, Qutb’s
analysis represented a shift in focus from a
nationalist struggle to a revolutionary struggle.
Qutb’s eventual execution by the state led some
to see him as a martyr (Wright p. 31). These
events had the effect of reinvigorating the
Brotherhood and helping it dampen the
effectiveness of subsequent crackdowns. People
who still believe the Brotherhood to be radical

This uncertainly regarding the role of the
Secret Apparatus in the Brotherhood has created
some competing interpretations of how the
history of the Brotherhood has affected the
organization. Some scholars see the provision
of social services as the defining element of the
Brotherhood’s foundation, while others believe
the creation of the Secret Apparatus defined the
existence and legacy of the Brotherhood. Juan
Cole believes in the former’s importance, that
the Brotherhood was created as a moderate
organization dedicated to providing social
services (Cole 51). Although Cole does
acknowledge the radicalization inherent in the
creation of the Secret Apparatus, he believes the
radicalization to have been temporary and
caused by the consequences of British imperial
policy, specifically the creation of Israel (Cole
p. 52, 55). Cole sees the Brotherhood’s
commitment to private property (the group
opposed land reform in Egypt) as evidence that
the group wanted to establish a moderate
government, distinct from the dictatorial models
present in European fascism (Cole p. 44-45).
Ultimately, it was Nasser’s popularity that
prevented the group from ever assuming power
after independence, although the lingering
popularity of the Brotherhood eventually led
Nasser to crack down on the group in the
interest of preserving his own political power
(Cole p. 56-7).
Many other people and organizations,
most notably the Egyptian government, focus on
the militant elements of the Brotherhood’s past.
In conjunction with the creation of the Secret
Apparatus, subscribers to this view on the
Brotherhood often focus on the ideologue Sayid
Qutb, who Cole regards as a fringe member of
the movement (Cole p. 64-65). Initially Qutb
did not join the Brotherhood due to an
intellectual rivalry with Banna, and eventually
he fled Egypt for America in the midst of a
British crackdown on Islamic activism (Wright
62
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Muslim Brotherhood, that inspiring meaningful
political reform through pragmatic means is a
major goal of the party.
After this initial foray into politics, the
Brotherhood began to clarify the political
positions it stood for. Although many of its
platforms remain murky to this day, mainly due
to its illegality, in 1991 the Brotherhood and
other opposition groups committed themselves
to a ten-point political platform that included
many of the characteristics associated with a
western democracy, such as free formation of
political parties, direct election of the president,
independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and
allowing non-Muslims to follow their own
religious laws (Mecham p. 192). This
demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood was
no longer solely representative of those pushing
for an Islamic government, but that it also
represented a democratic alternative to
Mubarak’s continued move toward
authoritarianism. Furthermore, this call for
democratic norms represented a clear borrowing
from the western concept of democracy
(Mecham p. 194), a radical departure from
Qutb’s belief that the western model of
statehood was alien to Islam.
Another key element of the Brotherhood
was establishing control over the professional
syndicates in Egypt. This has allowed the
Brotherhood to expand its appeal by providing
an avenue to address employed Egyptians. The
syndicates also serve as means for the
distribution of the public services offered by the
Brotherhood, as well a source of professionals
that aid in the provision of these social services.
The role played by the Brotherhood in the
professional syndicates has also proven the
Brotherhood’s leadership to be competent and
honest administrators, adding to their reputation
as a potentially effective alternative to the status
quo (Demmelhuber p. 125).

often point to Qutb’s work and role in the
organization as the defining element of the
Brotherhood. Most importantly, these two
interpretations of the Brotherhood demonstrate
that there is a lot of room for interpretation
when rendering a judgment about the group
based solely on its origins. However, recent
development suggest that the “moderate”
Muslim Brotherhood offers a more accurate way
of understanding the group’s past in relation to
the present.
The next major relevant organizational
development was the moderation of the Muslim
Brotherhood, demonstrated by its participation
in the 1984 parliamentary elections. At the
time, the Brotherhood was (and remains) illegal.
However, participation in elections
demonstrated a willingness to interact with the
state through open, official and legal channels, a
major turn for the Brotherhood whose
legitimacy has been historically based in the
informal sector. The “new” Brotherhood first
participated in the 1984 parliamentary elections
and, in the 1987 elections, adopted its signature
slogan of “Islam is the solution” (Mecham p.
190). The group ran on a platform of the
compatibility of its Islamic platform with a
democratic system of governance. A 2010
statement by the Brotherhood demonstrates that
its stated stance was that the organization
priority was not “Implementing Islamic law,
however, in moderation but becoming a party
and promoting Islamic values in a democratic
system” (Mayton 2010b). In fact, elections
became the Brotherhood’s main method of
engaging the Mubarak government after 1984
(Mecham p. 191). In order to engage the
government, the Brotherhood has not isolated
itself to working solely with Islamic activism
but has worked with a wide array of other
political actors, including secular socialist and
liberal parties (Mecham p. 190-191). These
actions demonstrate the main priority of the
63
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within the organization. If anything, the group
now finds itself on the most unsure footing since
its in entry into politics, partially due to its
electoral success. 2007 was a particularly
tumultuous year: in response to the success of
the Brotherhood at the polls, the government
passed a series of constitutional amendments
that outlawed any form of political activism
based on religion (Amnesty International
3/18/2007). This basically eliminated any
likelihood that the government would legalize
the Brotherhood in the near future. This recent
round of repression has had serious effects on
the group. Some believe that it stifled the
group’s attempt at mimicking its sister
movements in other countries such as separating
the political party from the rest of the
organization. This would make the political
branch of the Brotherhood, which is generally
moderate, independent from the broader
social/religious movement, controlled by a
generally conservative party hierarchy. This
separation has led to a moderation of the
political platforms among the Egyptian
Brotherhood’s regional sister movements
(Brown 2008 p. 12, 18).
The government’s repressive policies
can be seen as an effort to validate its
radicalism-based view of the Brotherhood. By
outlawing religious-based political activism, the
government is forcing the Brotherhood to
confront a new political reality that the
Brotherhood’s democratic policies will not
allow them to rise to the head of government,
offering incentives for the Brotherhood to
retreat from its democratic platforms. The
repression has prevented the separation of the
party from the broader religious movement,
which would likely have a moderating effect on
the political branch and make the party
consistent with the constitutional amendments.
These amendments mean that the government
can punish the group for acting through official

This new call for democracy resulted in
a surge of grassroots popular support from the
Bortherhood (Mecham p.193). However, this
support has led to a corresponding crackdown
by the Mubarak government. During this
crackdown, there was a revival of references to
Qutb by the government in an attempt to
ostracize the Brotherhood from mainstream
Egyptian government. In particular, one recent
march of masked students was highlighted as
reminiscent of the Secret Apparatus. This
association of the Brotherhood with its murky,
and often radical, past is the rhetorical
centerpiece of the government’s efforts to curb
the enthusiasm of the Brotherhood.
Government arrests have often targeted
moderates within the partly, limiting their
influence.
Despite these crackdowns, the
Brotherhood had a surprisingly successful
electoral performance in 2005. Despite running
as independents, candidates associated with the
group won 88 (20%) seats and became the
largest opposition to Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party (NDP). This again
demonstrated that the Brotherhood had become
a credible and popular political alternative to
Mubarak’s government (Mecham p. 193).
During the campaign, the group advocated an
inclusive national citizenship, not tied to
religion, as some had believed might occur
(Mecham p. 199). Two of the elected
parliament members were female, although
concerns have not faded that, if in power, the
Muslim Brotherhood would practice some
forms of gender discrimination (Mecham p.
200). The group emerged from the elections
with a new level of popular legitimacy in the
eyes of the Egyptian population and a level of
credibility in the eyes of international actors
(Mecham p. 194).
This increased role in the public sphere,
however, did not usher in a new era of stability
64
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main focus of the platform remained grounded
in social and economic issues, not religious
issues (Brown 2008 p. 5)
Two small portions of the platform
raised major concern. The first was a provision
against allowing women and non-Muslims to
serve as president of the state, reasoning that
only a Muslim male can lead a Muslim state.
This renewed fears that a government under the
Muslim Brotherhood might result in a step
backwards for the rights of women and religious
minorities. Though this platform was only a
draft, the inclusion of this position into the draft
sparked a heated debate within the organization
about whether such exclusions is consistent with
Sharia law (Brown 2008 p. 5).
The other major controversy in the draft
was the creation of an extra-constitutional body
of religious scholars to ensure that all legislation
is consistent with Article II of the Egyptian
Constitution, which dictates that all law must be
in accordance with the Sharia (Brown 2008 p.
4). This was troubling for a number of reasons.
First, it was a departure from the transparent and
democratic nature of previous Brotherhood
positions. Furthermore, it represented a major
philosophical shift from allowing individuals to
interpret religious law for themselves and
toward the potential of having a state-imposed
religious orthodoxy forced upon the population.
The language of the passage was not clear,
although it did suggest that this body of scholars
might have final say in several legislative
realms. Leadership within the organization has
suggested that if a final draft would ever be
produced, this portion would be omitted (Brown
2010 p. 11)
In response to the crackdown from the
government and the blowback from the leaking
of the draft, the Brotherhood has begun a slow
retreat from the public sphere under new
leadership. The recently appointed leader the
organization, Muhammad Badi, has a reputation

channels. However, if the group attempts to act
through unofficial channels, the government
will interpret this as a formal return to the days
of the Secret Apparatus, validating government
critiques of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as
repressive state policies.
By behaving in an authoritarian manner
and changing the constitution based on political
convenience, the Egyptian government is
encouraging a democratic backslide of the
Brotherhood in other ways. Political actors are
unlikely to behave in ways that cannot be
justified by the institutional or cultural norms of
a society (Tezcur p. 73). The Egyptian
government is eliminating the democratic norms
that would restrain political actors from acting
through unofficial and undemocratic means. An
important implication of the government’s
policies against the Brotherhood is that the
government views the Brotherhood as a threat
mainly to political power, not as a terrorist
organization. By attempting to demonstrate that
the Brotherhood has maintained its connections
to extremist interpretations of Islam, the
government would alienate the Brotherhood
from the majority of the Egyptian population
and minimize its political influence.
In 2007, the Brotherhood circulated a
draft party platform among intellectuals in
Egypt, which was subsequently leaked to the
press (Brown 2008 p.1). This was the most
detailed platform issued by the group to date
and was an effort to address some of the
criticism the group received for its often vague
statements in opposition to the current
government. While the greatest
accomplishment of the platform may be that the
vast majority of the it did not raise any major
controversies, the platform not only raised some
question in regard to the internal coherence of
the group but also detailed several policies that
would be antithetical to a democratic
government (Brown 2008 p. 5). However, the
65
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movements in Iran and Turkey, finding that a
moderation two of Islamic parties in both states
did indeed occur (Tezcur p. 83). Tezcur
describes the Islamic parties he focuses on as
often having weak democratic credentials in the
face of authoritarian regimes, which can
certainly be applied to the Muslim Brotherhood
(Tezcur p. 71). He also believes that the process
of Islamic-based opposition appears to be a
natural and organic process, noting that it
occurrs in the context of both a theocratic
government and a relatively secular democracy
(Tezcur p. 74). The Islamic opposition
movements, according to Tezcur, were a
“product of soul searching among younger
Islamicists” that led to an abandonment of
“utopian goals in favor of pragmatic, pluralistic
and moderation discourse” (Tezcur p. 74). The
re-entry of the Brotherhood into electoral
politics and the role of the younger moderate
faction within the group fit the Brotherhood into
Tezcur’s analysis of Islamic opposition
movements.
One major assumption Michels based his
study on is that political parties are controlled
by elites, who could (and often did) make
decisions without input from the party as a
whole (Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 71). A
later discussion on the internal structure of the
Brotherhood shows that the organization does
indeed have a strong centralized hierarchy that
has control over the party apparatus, meaning
that Michel’s assumption does not preclude the
Brotherhood from his theory. Michels believes
that the pursuit of votes and the organizational
structure cause the moderation of political
parties within a democracy because elites within
the party make rational decisions to shift
policies to the center in the pursuit of electoral
votes or risk electoral failure (Michels, quoted
in Tezcur 71). In fact, the use of an Islamic
identity may simply be an instrumental choice
by the party to appeal to a broadly defined

for engagement through the religious movement
more than the political movement (Brown
2010b). Despite Amnesty International’s call
for the government crackdown against the
Muslim Brotherhood to end, the government has
recently escalated its crackdown by targeting
high-ranking officers of the Brotherhood, a
departure from its previous crackdowns
(Mayton 2010a). In this context, the
Brotherhood’s retreat does not bode well for
opposition to Mubarak in Egypt. It is widely
expected that Hosni Mubarak will have his son,
Gamel, succeed him following the end of his
term (Demmelhuber p. 119). Some analysis
suggests that, besides making a mockery of the
democratic rhetoric of the current government,
it will also benefit a converging class of
business and political elites, who will likely
profit from Gamel Mubarak’s technocratic
inclinations (Demmelhuber p. 119). The
creation of a “Mubarak dynasty” in Egypt
would represent the continuing erosion of
democratic governance within the country.
The enormous role played by the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian opposition
enhances the importance of any contribution to
democratic goverance. The two major
controversies in the 2007 platform represent a
democratic backslide from previous positions.
Moderation theory, developed by Robert
Michels in a study of European radical socialist
parties, can be useful when addressing whether
these positions would serve as a serious barrier
to democracy in Egypt. Although socialism and
Islam are certainly not identical, the holistic
nature of the socialist philosophy has certain
parallels with the increased role of Islam
(represented by the Ulama Council) in the 2007
party platform. Also, like the Brotherhood, the
socialist parties studied by Michels were
initially outside of electoral politics.
Guines Tezcur specifically relates
moderation theory to Islamic opposition
66
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there needs to exist popular sentiment to
continue to drive the Brotherhood away from
positions antithetical to democratic goverance.
World Public Opinion polls demonstrate that
this would be the case: a 2008 poll showed that
98% of Egyptians agree that the will of the
people should be the basis of the authority of the
government (emphasis added, WPO 2008).
Ninety-seven percent believes that the will of
the people should have a greater influence in the
government than it already does (WPO 2008).
Other polls conducted by World Public Opinion
show that 75% of the Egyptian population
believes it is important that a country is
governed democratically and 67% believes it is
important to be able to express unpopular views
(WPO 2009). These polls demonstrate that the
Egyptian population will continue to enable
party leaders to make rational decisions toward
an increasingly moderate platform. Recent
development seems to confirm this, as it is
expected the Brotherhood will defer to existing
political institutions instead of creating new
ones in any subsequent platforms (Brown 2008
p. 16).
Another crucial causal factor of
moderation is the party’s lack of resources.
Once an electoral strategy has been established,
it is often not possible for the party to pursue an
alternative strategy (Tezcur p. 76). Changes
made by the elite, out of calculated self-interest,
become the genuine direction of the party.
However, the actions of the state can change or
prevent this moderation. The greater the threat
from state oppression, “the more cautious and
risk adverse reformers are” (Tezcur p. 75). By
threatening the group with repression, decision
makers within the party will avoid using open
and official channels to accomplish their goal.
Repression affects the rational decision of the
elite within the party because it alters the costbenefit analysis that elites make in their decision
to potentially moderate the party. Ultimately,

identity, as was the case with some Islamic
activism in Turkey (Tezcur p. 80). Literature on
the radical socialist parties indicates that their
involvement in parliamentary politics has
brought about moderation (Tezcur p. 73).
Moderation theory can be applied to the
Muslim Brotherhood. First, it should be noted
that the recent post-1984 moderation process
can be seen as consistent with moderation
theory. The decision was made by elites within
the organization, since there was no external
electoral accountability prior to entry in the
1984 elections. Entry into electoral politics,
with the Brotherhood’s current respect for
existing political institutions, is a clear
moderation from the philosophy of some of its
earlier ideologues, especially that of Qutb. One
key element of the moderation process is the
abandonment of exclusivist rhetoric (Michels,
quoted in Tezcur pp. 71-2). This would be good
news for the Coptic Christian minority and
women, in regard to a more open field for
candidate selection. Indeed, Abdul Moneim
Aboul, a jailed moderate leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood, seems to confirm this possibility,
saying that the provisions against Copts and
women serving as president are not final
(Mayton 2010a). Also, in describing loyalty to
a socialist identity, Michels comments that
beliefs do not directly lead to decisions by
actors but rather political actors are predisposed
to certain beliefs because of their ideology
(Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 73). The
Brotherhood’s Islamic identity would not
prevent a repeal of the position against nonMuslims. Previous ideological shifts have
demonstrated that the Brotherhood’s Islamic
identity has not been a serious barrier to other
democratic party platforms.
As such changes take place within the
party, “party organization acquires a life of its
own at the expense of revolutionary principles”
(Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 71). However,
67
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Muslim Brotherhood, had significant economic
and social reform platforms, tapping into the
large segments of the population who felt
disenpowered or ignored by the Congress or
Mubarak governments.
India had initially formed a state based
on secular nationalism, although Jawaharlal
Nehru, India’s first prime minister, adopted a
narrow form of state-sponsored secularism
(Jugersmeyer p. 107). Key to this secular
nationalism was the protection of religious
minority rights, especially the rights of
Muslims. The BJP made the claim that this was
actually preferential treatment of Muslims, who
did not deserve a role in what the BJP believed
was India’s Hindu civilization. Calling this
protection of religious rights “pseudosecularism,” the BJP wanted the state to
formally adopt an exclusively Hindu culture as a
means to reclaim its previous cultural glory.
This was an exclusivist ideology, which defined
religious minorities as foreign to Indian culture.
Following India’s independence, the
state was essentially a one-party democracy,
with the Congress party receiving the dominant
share of the votes. Despite being basically
unchallenged until the rise of the BJP, the
Indian state remained a democracy. However,
the Congress Party began to change as a second
generation of political leaders, those not directly
involved in national independence movement,
began to assume leadership within the party.
This new generation was more concerned with
the political end of the Congress Party, which
originally had a strong network of social
institutions as well as a party apparatus
(Varshney 2002 p. 241). This weakened loyalty
to the Congress Party among its traditional
support groups. The declining state of the
Congress Party, which had been the bastion of
secular nationalism in the Indian state, created
the space that allowed communal political

repression increases the cost of operating in an
official and transparent manner, disincentivizing
their use.
Socialist and other Islamic parties are
not the only relevant examples when discussing
the democratic viability of the Muslim
Brotherhood. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
in India provides another extremely useful
comparison. The BJP is a Hindu-nationalist
party that rose to prominence in the late 1980s
and played an increasingly large role in Indian
politics, culminating in the creation of its own
government from 1999 to 2004. As the party
came to power, its Hindu nationalist stance
(which was its defining attribute into the early
1990s) morphed into a more centrist political
ideology. This change was a consequence of
the democratic structure of the Indian
government and the popularity of oppositional
rhetoric to the existing political order, in the
case of the BJP, the Congress Party.
In the case of the BJP, the popularity of
oppositional rhetoric increased support for the
party but masked internal cleavages within the
party and its voters. During this time in which
cleavages are less important, the internal
structure of the party empowers an inherited
conservative party elite, allowing them to
control the rhetoric of the party. The result is
that certain elements of the party’s rhetoric are
not representative of the party’s popular
support, but those who disagree with the parts of
these parts of the party line stay with the party
because it offers the best chance to change the
political status quo. Once the party achieves a
significant degree of popularity in an open
political setting, these cleavages become salient
and the party must realistically address its
support or risk losing it. It is important to
recognize that a party having a religious
platform does not make it impossible to attract
the support of those not interested in its
religious message. The BJP, similar to the
68
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religion is no longer a major element in BJP
coalition building (Hasan p 18, 16, Basu 2000 p.
399). A the state level, the BJP has made a
greater effort to appeal to a diverse body of
voters, going so far as to alter its message to
appeal to different groups (Basu 1996 p.68).
The closer the BJP has come to exercising
national power, the more moderate is has
become (Basu 2000 p. 384)
One major causal factor of the
moderation of the BJP is what Ashutosh
Varshney calls “the self-correcting mechanisms
of Indian democracy” (Varshney 1995 p. 38).
Varshney argues that the independence and
unpredictability of government institutions, the
realities of identity politics in India, and certain
voting patterns punish parties for extremist
rhetoric and violations of democratic norms.
Institutional unpredictability, diversity, and
independence have prevented a single party
from monopolizing control of government
institutions by preventing parties in power from
being able to change the norms away from
democratic governance (Varshney 1995 p. 40).
When parties have challenged the governmental
institutions, they have been rebuked, ensuring
compliance with the existing democratic norms.
Varshney points out that the judiciary branch
decided that religious beliefs cannot overtake
secular issues (Varshney 1995 p. 40). The BJP
bumped up against these institutional barriers as
it rose to political prominence and was forced to
bring its policies in line with the democratic
norms of Indian governance.
The role of identity politics in Indian
democracy is twofold. First, the wide variety of
cleavages in India means that a party cannot just
appeal to a single cleavage group and expect to
make serious political gains (Varshney 1995 p.
41). This reality forced the BJP to appeal to
different groups and moderate its positions in
doing so. The second role played by identity
was that the continuing use of Hindu identity by

developments, on which the BJP attempted to
capitalize (Varshney 2002 p. 242-3).
It was within this context that the
destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya
took place. The mosque was built on the site of
the alleged birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama
and became a focal point of the Hindu
nationalist movement in the early 1990s. After
a series of demonstrations and unclear
government positions, the mosque was
destroyed, setting off a round of communal
violence. Two organizations, the RSS and
VHP, both linked to the BJP, were believed to
have had a major role in stirring up the
communal tension that led to the riots
(Juergensmeyer p. 111). The BJP attempted to
capitalize on the renewed salience of a
politicized Hindu identity in electoral politics,
going as far as releasing its own White Paper on
the destruction of the mosque to present an
alternative explanation and increasing the Hindu
nationalist rhetoric. However, the BJP did not
see an increase in its vote share following the
destruction of the mosque and was generally
humiliated at the elections (Hasan p. 15), an
early indication that the success of the BJP was
not only the product of Hindu nationalism.
This public failure forced the BJP to
“harmonize its ideas with thirst for power”
(Hasan p. 15). While maintaining a Hindu
nationalist rhetoric, the BJP changed a number
of its policies. It offered some policies that are
friendly to Muslims under the guise of
economic policies (Basu 1996 p. 61-2). Other
economic policies have generally been viewed
as liberal, especially catering to a rising middle
class coming from the information technology
sector, a reversal from its previous nationalist
economic position (Hasan p. 18, Jugersmeyer p.
114). The BJP has made an effort to appeal to
different groups, both at the federal and state
level. It reversed its policy of not making
coalitions in order to expand its power; in fact,
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power (Phillips p. 21-2). In its initial ten-point
opposition plan, the Brotherhood committed
itself to maintaining the independence of the
judiciary branch as well as creating a more
empowered legislative branch through the
creation of a parliamentary system (Mecham p.
192). The likely retraction of the creation of an
extra-constitutional religious panel would
signify a rededication to this liberal position.
These institutions would check some of the less
democratic positions of the Brotherhood.
The use of an “Islamic” identity is also
creating a similar dilution of the politically
constructed identity, as well as strategic
opposition. Much like some groups that
opposed the BJP in India, the Christian Coptic
minority has openly advocated that people vote
along an anti-Muslim Brotherhood line (Salam
2010). Given the significant percentage of the
Copts in the Egyptian population, such
mobilization against a specific group would
likely have stifling legislative implications if the
Brotherhood should be legalized and participate
in parliamentary politics with anti-Coptic
positions. A later discussion of cleavages
within the Muslim Brotherhood will also
demonstrate a dilution of a politicized Islamic
identity. As the group has expanded, it has
deviated from its norm of having a unitary party
voice because an increasingly diverse group of
people is being brought under the Islamic
identity of the Brotherhood.
There are other reasons that suggest a
moderation of the Brotherhood would take place
if it were to be integrated into a democratic
system because, like the BJP, the religious
rhetoric of the party is not the cause of, or
representative of, the popular support of the
party. To understand how the religious rhetoric
of a party might not be representative of its
mass following, it is necessary to understand the
structure of each party. In the case of the BJP,
the party is directly linked to the Rashtriya

the BJP in political matters had diluted the
meaning of the term (Varshney 1995 p. 39). As
more and more people joined the BJP, its
definition of what was truly a “Hindu” had to
change to accommodate its new members. The
result was that the term became watered down
and what it meant to be a Hindu in the BJP in
1989 was radically different than what it meant
to be a Hindu in the BJP in 1999. This dilution
of the conceptions of Hindu identity led several
of the more extreme Hindu nationalists to leave
the BJP and form their own parties. By
expanding its popular base, the BJP destroyed
the cohesiveness of the very identity it was
trying to preserve. The Hindu identity the BJP
was trying to support became less exclusivist
and identity politics based on this “Hindu”
identity now had to accommodate a diverse
body of support or risk losing support.
Politicization of “Hindu” identity with
such a communal purpose also fueled “strategic
voting,” meaning that people opposed to the
BJP voted for the party they believed would
have the best chance of defeating the BJP
(Varshney 1995 p. 40). In effect, even though
the BJP increased its vote share, it did not
automatically gain political power because the
BJP unified its opposition through its use of
Hindu nationalism. The democratic process of
the Indian government meant that creating an
“in group” as the basis of a political party meant
creating a unified opposition of the “out group.”
Similar developments within the
Egyptian political system and the Muslim
Brotherhood’s own platform suggest that the
“self-correcting mechanisms” Varshney pointed
out exist, or would exist if the Brotherhood
achieved power, in the Egyptian political
system. Despite the democratic backslide, the
judiciary branch of Egypt has remained largely
independent of the executive branch (which also
controls the legislative), and has remained the
target of Mubarak’s attempt to expand his
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most notably its desire to change the national
language to a northern dialect of Hindi and
exclude Urdu as an official language. However,
as the BJP began to expand, it had to create a
more nationally appealing language position and
abandon its desire to change the national
language. As the BJP began to expand its
influence to other regions, it was forced to
concede this platform to attract voters from
other regions (Basu 2000 p. 386).
As it expanded, the BJP moved away
from its traditional support by increasingly
courting, a voter bloc know as Other Backward
Castes (OBCs) (Hearth p. 256). In fact, the
OBC made up a group of the fastest-rising party
personnel in the mid-1990s (Varshney 1995 p.
40). Eventually, the support from nontraditional locations was greater than support
from traditional locations (Hearth p. 256). The
BJP was filling the space left by Congress as its
second and latter generations of political leaders
retreated from the social sphere. This validates
Amrita Basu’s assertion that the “BJP has given
voices to sources of frustration and aggression
that have little to do with religious faith” (Basu
1996 p. 58). The inability of increased religious
rhetoric to attract more voters also suggests that
the electoral success was not related to religious
platforms, but accompanying platforms. The
BJP was able to voice political grievances
against the Congress system and capitalize on
dissatisfaction with the political status quo
(Hasan p. 15, Basu 1996 p. 64). During its rise
to power, the BJP was able to consistently win
the “anti-establishment” vote (Basu 2000 p.
385).
Thus, this new source of BJP support,
which made up the majority of the support,
came mainly from non-traditional voters who
saw the BJP as a political movement against the
Congress Party, not as an attempt to revitalize
India as a purely “Hindu” civilization. Since the
BJP represented the major viable opposition to

Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a volunteer
organization that advocates an extreme form of
Hindu nationalism. The RSS was founded in
1925 by middle-class Hindu nationalists to train
young men to resist the appeal of a secular
society (Juergensmeyer p 106). The philosophy
of the group makes numerous references to a
great Hindu past and a desire to restore that past
by creating a Hindu nation (Juergensmeyer p.
107). The RSS supplied not only the early party
cadres, but also the energy and dedication to get
the BJP off the ground (Juergensmeyer 2008 p.
107, Basu 1996 p.64).
With this early control, the RSS turned
the BJP into a centralized party, with much of
the control lying with the party elite provided to
the BJP by the RSS (Basu 1996 p. 60). It also
created a situation of dependency, in which the
BJP could not break ties with the RSS (Hasan p.
19). From its inception to its rise to
prominence, the RSS had a firm grip on the
internal mechanisms of the party. As the BJP
expanded its support, this internal control would
not change to reflect new, more inclusive
realities of the party’ support. Essentially, the
people who came to support the BJP for
oppositional reasons inherited a party apparatus
that had its roots firmly in Hindu nationalism.
During expansion, the BJP began to
move away from its traditional sources of upper
caste Hindu nationalists support. Oliver Hearth
tracks the expansion of the BJP’s electoral base,
noting that when it first began to rise to
prominence in 1989, the BJP was mainly a
regional phenomenon, not a nationwide
movement (Hearth p. 232). The party expanded
its support by courting voters in regions
adjacent to pre-existing supportive regions, not
through a simultaneous expansion of support
(Hearth p. 233). The regional spread of political
support did have a direct role in the moderation
of the BJP. It forced the BJP to abandon some
of its religious platforms tied to regionalism,
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Key to understanding the conservative
faction within the party is the fact that the
faction does not automatically support religion
over democracy (Madbouli 2010). The group
does indeed want to put a greater emphasis on
strengthening the ideological outreach of the
group (Madbouli 2010). However, there is also
a strong organizational component, with the
conservatives favoring pre-existing and
expedient organizational structure, even though
they do not always favor internal democracy
(Rashwan). This is not just a way of preserving
their own power within the party, but also seen
as a way of protecting the party itself. Leaders
of the conservative faction moved through the
ranks of the Brotherhood in the 1950s, in the
context of the crackdowns by the British and
eventually Nasser (Ursala). The fact that the
quick, and somewhat secretive, organizational
structure has helped and continues to help the
Brotherhood survive new crackdowns by the
government is recognized by the conservatives
within the party.
The divide between the moderates and
conservatives is becoming increasingly more
apparent. In response to the 2007 platform,
visible differences began to emerge between the
two camps (Brown 2008 p. 6). Many reformers
claimed the draft was not circulated among all
party members and, thus, was not a product of
the entire organization (Brown 2008 pp. 7-8).
More recently, the election of a new Supreme
Guide of the Brotherhood revealed the split
between the two groups (Al-Ahram nos. 969,
983). While a compromise was used to select a
new leader, many still felt it left out many of the
moderates, who are disenfranchised by the
current party structure (Rashwan). The result
was that Mohammed Baidi, a conservative with
a history in the ideological outreach of the
Brotherhood, was chosen as the next (and
current) Supreme Guide (Brown 2010, Al
Ahram no. 983).

the Congress Party, the religious rhetoric
preached by the inherited party elites in control
of the party apparatus did not drive away the
more politically oriented recent supporters of
the BJP. However, once the BJP came to
power, the divide between the traditional
support and the more moderate recent
supporters became salient. The BJP could not
alienate these voters or else it would lose power
and with it any chance the elites had at passing a
religious agenda. The result was that, in
accordance with moderation theory, RSS
leadership consented to the moderation in
exchange for political power (Hasan p. 15).
A similar occurrence is taking place
within the Muslim Brotherhood. The cleavage
between the conservatives and moderates is
becoming increasingly salient, and would have a
moderating effect should the Brotherhood
participate in elections with the goals of
winning them. The moderates, or reformers,
draw their leadership from the professional
syndicates and its support from the student
movements and professional syndicates (AlAhram no. 970). As a whole, the group favors a
greater emphasis on the electoral aspect of the
movement, a separation of the party from the
movement, and more internal democracy within
the party. Many reformers have voiced a
preference for a Turkish-style democracy
(Mayton 2010b). The group also favors an
active role for the group in Egyptian society
(Madbouli 2010). Although the moderates tend
to be younger than the conservatives, their
leaders have still been in the movement since
the 1970s (Al-Alhram no. 970). The reformers
tend to have a more grassroots nature to their
support and activism, having especially
embraced the internet, party because the
conservatives have a much stronger grip on the
official channels of the partly (Al-Ahram no
970, Ursala 2009).
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voters. The rise in popularity of both groups is
not tied to its religious rhetoric, which has been
a constant, but the ability of the party to offer a
coherent and appealing alternative to the
political status quo. Any retraction of the
democratic platform, which is the basis of this
alternative, would cost the Brotherhood dearly
in public support. The Muslim Brotherhood has
had an Islamic identity since its creation, but it
is only through the addition of peaceful and
democratic activism in opposition to Mubarak
that the group has emerged as the only viable
opposition party to Mubarak. Through
participation in elections, the leadership of the
party would have to confront this reality and
realistically address its support or lose it.
The moderate faction has its roots in the
more populist (and popular) elements of the
Brotherhood. Many of the moderates started in
student movements in the 1970s and became
leaders of the professional syndicates (Phillips
p. 14). The syndicates have served as a source
of the Brotherhood’s popularity because they
serve as a means of distributing social services
and demonstrate the administrative qualities of
the Brotherhood that have made them
exceptionally popular political candidates.
Through its control of the medical syndicate, the
Brotherhood is able to offer doctors better
salaries than the government, run 22 hospitals,
and have schools in every administrative district
(Harrigan p. 104). These social services have
expanded the popularity of the Brotherhood
tremendously (Harrigan p. 104). The moderate
factions of the Muslim Brotherhood are the
group that has been the public face of the
organization on the street and administrative
backbone of the Brotherhood during its most
recent rise to popularity starting toward the end
of the 1980s. This method of expanding
electoral support has branched the Brotherhood
out toward non-traditional sources of support

The internal structure of the Brotherhood
empowers the conservative faction, mainly
through seniority. While this does reward
loyalty to the movement and promote the
survival of the organization, it also means that
the leadership of the Brotherhood has not
changed to reflect its massive increase in
popularity following the entry into politics,
similar to the BJP. The Guidance or Shura
Council, which formulates group policy and
elects the Supreme Guide (head executive), is
unelected (Phillips p. 12; Rashwan). The result
is that this council is now controlled by the firstgeneration conservative faction and the party
apparatus represent the ideological values of the
conservatives, partly as a tactic to maintain its
unique status among the Egyptian opposition
groups (Brown 2008 p. 17). Unlike the BJP
elite prior to electoral success, the elite within
the Brotherhood have presented a more
moderate stance. They have offered a
progressive combination of democracy and
Islam that looks toward the future as a source of
inspiration, unlike the primordial view of Indian
civilization initially offered by the BJP. While
it is not always clear whether the Brotherhood’s
leadership sees Islam or democracy as its first
priority, it is important to remember that the
voice of the party is not always representative of
the popular support, and those who control the
voice of the party have a history of moderating
their stances.
The change in popular support of the
Brotherhood is a product of recent events,
especially the offering of a democratic
alternative to the current government and an
increased role of the Brotherhood in the public
sphere, while the leadership is a product of
seniority. The makeup of party support has
dramatically changed without corresponding
changes in the party leadership. Like the BJP,
the Brotherhood offers an alternative to the
status quo that appeals to the self-interest of the
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Religious parties are not solely defined
by their religious platforms. While a religious
identity may appeal to some as a source of
political authority, these parties often offer
social, economic and political platforms that can
attract support for entirely non-religious
reasons. With the BJP and Muslim
Brotherhood, respect for democratic institutions
is a key element of both parties’ political
policies. In the case of the BJP, the already
existing strength of Indian democratic
institutions never made destruction of liberal
institutions an option. The rhetoric of the
Muslim Brotherhood for the respect of, and
desire to create, democratic institutions is both
an encouraging sign and a key element to its
popularity. Political parties that do not practice
a respect for democratic institutions will not
consensually contribute to democratic
governance in a positive manner, whether
religious in nature or not, but to condemn a
democratic party based on its belief in the role
of religion is, in itself, an undemocratic practice.

through non-religious means, much like the
BJP.
Demonstrating the electoral viability of
the moderates is the electoral branch of the
Brotherhood, in which the younger generation is
extremely active (Mecham p. 103). The leader
of the electoral branch is a moderate who has
openly voiced his desire for a separation of the
party from the broader religious movement
(Brown 2008 p. 8). The success of this
moderate branch in the 2005 elections
demonstrates the support the moderates have
from the Egyptian population. The role of the
Brotherhood as the most successful political
opposition to Mubarak means that casting a vote
for the Brotherhood is also a rejection of the
current status quo. Voting for a Muslim
Brotherhood candidate does not automatically
indicate support for the party elite. Similar to
the BJP, the Brotherhood has expanded into
non-traditional sources of support, partially by
presenting themselves as the only alternative to
the status quo. As the government continually
deviates from its democratic rhetoric, the role of
the Brotherhood as an opposition group
becomes increasingly important. Displeasure
with the current government in Egypt creates a
legitimate reason to vote for the Brotherhood.
These similarities to the BJP suggest that
the Brotherhood’s most recent return to
popularity is dependent on their ability to voice
an attractive alternative to Mubarak. Their
ability to do so thus far has kept the party intact,
despite the emerging visibility of cleavages. If
legalized, electoral politics will force the
Brotherhood to address internal cleavages and
make meaningful concessions to its numerous
moderate supporters or risk losing their support.
The very democratic reforms advocated by the
Brotherhood and the source of its recent surge in
popularity will politically isolate them unless
they embrace the reforms.
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